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Abstract
Networks can have an important eﬀect on economic outcomes. Given the complex-
ity of many of these networks, agents will generally not know their structure. We study
the sensitivity of game-theoretic predictions to the speciﬁcation of players’ (common)
prior on the network in a setting where players play a ﬁxed game with their neighbors
and only have local information on the network structure. We show that two priors are
close in a strategic sense if and only if (i) the priors assign similar probabilities to all
events that involve a player and his neighbors, and (ii) with high probability, a player
believes, given his type, that his neighbors’ conditional beliefs are close under the two
priors, and that his neighbors believe, given their type, that...the conditional beliefs
of their neighbors are close, for any number of iterations.
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Keywords: Network games, incomplete information, higher order beliefs, continuity, ran-
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In many contexts, an agent’s well-being primarily depends on his own action and on
the actions of those with whom he has a direct relationship, rather than on the behavior
of the population at large. Indeed, Goolsbee and Klenow (2002) and Tucker (2006) ﬁnd
that an individual’s decision to adopt a particular communication technology is primarily
inﬂuenced by the adoption decisions of those with whom he interacts directly, rather than by
the overall adoption level. Also, an agent’s connections provide access to various resources
such as information, knowledge and capital. For instance, a key success factor for a ﬁrm in
a high tech sector such as the biotechnology industry is its position in a network of R&D
partnerships (Powell et al., 1996).1 Hence, in a variety of settings, the networks formed
by agents’ relations are important in determining economic outcomes. These networks are
generally large and complex, and evolve rapidly over time.2 This suggests that agents often
will not know the exact structure of the network they belong to.3 At the same time, it
is unclear what beliefs agents have about their networks.4 We consider a setting in which
agents interact strategically with their neighbors in a network under incomplete information
on the network structure. We study the sensitivity of game-theoretic predictions in such
games to the speciﬁcation of players’ beliefs on the network.
More speciﬁcally, suppose that players are located on a network and play a ﬁxed game
with their neighbors. Payoﬀs only depend on a player’s own action and characteristics and
on the actions and characteristics of his neighbors. Players have a common prior over the
network, i.e., a probability distribution over a ﬁxed set of networks. In addition, they have
some local information: each player knows the number of neighbors he has in the network,
i.e., a player’s type is his degree. We deﬁne a function that for any two priors over a set of
networks gives their strategic distance. Loosely speaking, the strategic distance between two
1Other empirical studies that highlight the role of networks include Coleman et al. (1966) and Conley
and Udry (2005) on the diﬀusion of new technologies in medicine and agriculture, respectively, Granovetter
(1974) on job search, Tucker (2005) on adoption decisions, and Fafchamps and Lund (2003) on informal
insurance networks in developing countries.
2For instance, several empirical emphasize the ﬂexibility of R&D collaborations, with ﬁrms having many
short term projects with many diﬀerent partners (e.g. Hagedoorn, 2002; Powell et al., 2005).
3Indeed, Krackhardt and Hanson (1993) report that informal networks are mostly unobservable to senior
executives. Also, Powell et al. (1996, p.120) observe that in R&D collaborations in biotechnology, “beneath
most formal ties [...] lies a sea of informal relations”.
4Evidence suggests that agents use simple heuristics (Janicik and Larrick, 2005), and that their perception
of the network is biased (e.g. Kumbasar et al., 1994), even in an environment with strong incentives (Johnson
and Orbach, 2002).
2priors is small if for any game with bounded payoﬀ functions in which players hold one of
these priors, for any equilibrium in that game, there is an approximate equilibrium in the
associated game with the other prior such that ex ante expected payoﬀs are close under both
equilibria. If that is the case, players can obtain approximately the same ex ante expected
payoﬀs under both priors, and we say that the two priors are close in a strategic sense. We
study the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for two priors to be close in a strategic sense. We
thus consider a type of lower hemicontinuity of the correspondence of (interim) approximate
equilibria in network games (see Engl, 1995, for a discussion of diﬀerent continuity concepts).
Our main result (Theorem 5.3) shows that two priors are close in a strategic sense if and
only if (i) the priors assign similar probabilities to all local events, i.e., events that involve
a player and his neighbors, and (ii) with high probability, a player believes, given his type,
that his neighbors’ conditional beliefs are close under the two priors, and that his neighbors
believe, given their type, that...the conditional beliefs of their neighbors are close, and so
on, for any number of iterations.
This result can be interpreted as follows. On the one hand, we can analyze a network
game as a set of overlapping “local games” as far as ex ante beliefs are concerned: priors
only need to assign similar probabilities to local events. On the other hand, these local
games are interlaced through players’ conditional beliefs: players need to form beliefs on
the beliefs of his neighbors about the beliefs of their neighbors, and so on. This means
that events that have small probability ex ante can have a large eﬀect on outcomes through
players’ conditional beliefs: even if with high probability, each player has a type such that
his conditional beliefs are close under the two priors, it may be the case that with high
probability, a player thinks it is likely, given his type, that his neighbors think it is likely,
given their type,...the conditional beliefs of their neighbors are very diﬀerent. Players’ higher
order beliefs can thus have a large impact on outcomes if condition (ii) is not satisﬁed.
Interestingly, condition (ii) can also be formulated in terms of correlations among types.
An equivalent formulation of (ii) is that the set of types for which conditional beliefs are
close under the two priors has to have high probability, and is suﬃciently cohesive in the
sense that with high conditional probability, a type in that set interacts only with types in
that set that, with high conditional probability, only interact with types in that set, and so
on. Compare this result to the ﬁndings of Morris (2000) on contagion on networks. Morris
studies a setting with complete information on the network structure. He ﬁnds that, starting
from a ﬁnite set of players X, behavior does not spread contagiously by myopic best-reply
dynamics on a network with a countably inﬁnite number of players if and only if the network
of players not belonging to X contains a large group of players Y that is suﬃciently cohesive,
3in the sense that players from Y interact mostly with other players from Y , who in turn
interact primarily with other players from Y , and so on.
Condition (ii) is a direct stochastic analogue of this result of Morris. Rather than a ﬁxed
network of players, as in Morris (2000), we consider a random network of players, which
induces a ﬁxed interaction structure on the players’ types. The situation we consider is
the following. Suppose that there is a set of types with small prior probability for whom
conditional beliefs are very diﬀerent under two priors (so that they may take diﬀerent actions
under the two priors). We ask under what conditions these types do not “infect” a large (in
terms of ex ante probability) set of types through players’ higher order beliefs. This is the
case precisely when there is a group of types with high prior probability which is suﬃciently
cohesive. We thus map a random network of players to a ﬁxed interaction structure of
types. This allows us to use the formal equivalence between games on a ﬁxed network with
complete information and games with incomplete information established by Morris (1997,
2000), which in turn enables us to use ideas from literature on higher order beliefs.
Our result thus sheds light on the relation between incomplete information games, net-
work games with complete information, and network games in which players have incomplete
information about the network structure. Our results are also of practical importance. The
class of games we introduce, the class of network games of incomplete information, allows
for uncertainty over the network size and for arbitrary correlations among player types. So
far, the literature5 has mostly focused on network games in which the size of the network is
commonly known and player types are independent. We show that assumptions on players’
information on the network size and on the correlation among player types can have large
ramiﬁcations. When there is uncertainty about the network size, and when players believe
that there is nonzero correlation among types, a prior is sensitive to small probability events.
That is, an event that has small prior probability can have a large eﬀect on outcomes through
players’ conditional beliefs: a player may think it is likely, given his type, that his neighbors
think it is likely, given their types...that the small probability event is true. When the
size of the network is commonly known or when players believe that types are independent,
this is ruled out. We show that in those cases, closeness of the two priors in terms of the
prior probabilities assigned to local events (condition (i)) implies that there is a suﬃciently
large set of players whose conditional beliefs are close (condition (ii)). Hence, to explore
the full range of strategic outcomes, one needs to go beyond network games with a complete
information about the network size and independent types. The class of network games
of incomplete information provides a ﬂexible framework to analyze the eﬀects of diﬀerent
5See below for a discussion of this literature.
4assumptions on players’ priors.
The current paper is related to three distinct literatures. Firstly, it is related to a recent
literature that studies games on networks when players have incomplete information on
the network structure (e.g. Galeotti et al., 2006; Jackson and Yariv, 2007; Kets, 2007b;
Sundararajan, 2005). We refer to the games studied in this literature as Bayesian network
games, to distinguish this class from the class of games that we introduce. In Bayesian
network games, the size of the network is commonly known. Moreover, it is often assumed
that players’ types are (asymptotically) independent.6 By contrast, we allow for uncertainty
about the network size, and for arbitrary correlations among player types. Bayesian network
games are not a subclass of the class of network games of incomplete information, nor is the
converse the case. In Bayesian network games, the player set is common knowledge, which
is not the case for network games of incomplete information. As we discuss in Section 3, this
has implications for the way in which strategies are modeled in both classes of games.
Allowing for uncertainty about the network size and for correlation among player types
is both important and natural. It is important because, as we have argued above, the
assumptions on players’ beliefs about the network size and the correlations among player
types can have a qualitative eﬀect on game-theoretic predictions. It is natural because
agents will often be uncertain about the extent of their networks, and may well believe
that types of his neighbors are correlated. As for uncertainty on the network size, the
observation of Myerson (1998) that in some contexts, it is reasonable to assume that players
are uncertain about the number of other players in the game holds a fortiori for network
games, as in these games, players only interact with a small subset of players and have no
direct information about the players they do not interact with. As for players’ beliefs on
the correlation among player types, there is ample evidence that many social and economic
networks display positive assortativity, meaning that agents with a high (low) degree tend to
be linked primarily with agents with a high (low) degree (see Jackson, 2007, and references
therein). Moreover, evidence from social psychology suggests that individuals believe their
networks to be highly clustered, i.e., that their networks contain a large number of small
cycles (e.g. Crockett, 1982; Krackhardt and Kilduﬀ, 1999). Hence, it is natural to assume
that players believe that there is nonzero correlation among neighbor types.
Secondly, the current paper is related to the literature on games with population uncer-
tainty. Games with population uncertainty in which all players interact directly have been
studied by a number of authors (e.g. Kalai, 2004; McAfee and McMillan, 1987; Milchtaich,
2004; Myerson, 1998). In these games, players do not know how many players they interact
6Galeotti et al. (2006) and Kets (2007b) are exceptions.
5with. By contrast, we consider a setting in which players interact locally, i.e., they only
interact directly with a subset of players, and in which each player knows the number of
players he interacts with. However, a player does not know the number of players his neigh-
bors interact with. Hence, population uncertainty plays a distinctly diﬀerent role here than
in games with global interactions.
Finally, the current work builds on a literature that relates higher order beliefs to the
equilibria of incomplete information games, in particular Monderer and Samet (1989) and
Kajii and Morris (1998), and we use extensively concepts and techniques from this litera-
ture. Kajii and Morris (1998) study lower hemicontinuity of the approximate equilibrium
correspondence in Bayesian games with a (ﬁxed) ﬁnite player set and a countably inﬁnite
state space.7 Kajii and Morris show that two priors over this state space are strategically
close if and only if the prior probabilities of events are similar under the two priors and
with high probability, it is approximate common knowledge that all players attach similar
conditional probabilities to all events, i.e., with high probability, each player believes with
high conditional probability that the conditional beliefs of all players are similar under the
two priors and that all players believe with high conditional probability that the conditional
beliefs of all players are similar, and that all players believe with high conditional probabil-
ity that all players believe with high conditional probability...that the conditional beliefs of
all players are similar under the two priors (for any number of iterations). Our result can
thus be seen as a “spatial” analogue of this result: rather than requiring that all players
believe that all players believe...that the conditional beliefs of all players are similar, we
require that a player believes that his neighbors believe that their neighbors believe...that
the conditional beliefs of their neighbors are similar.8
Although we study the same issues as Kajii and Morris (1998), and follow their line
of argument in our proofs,9 conceptually, there are marked diﬀerences. We introduce the
local p-belief operator, a belief operator in the sense of Monderer and Samet (1989). The
local p-belief operator associates with each set of types a set of types that with conditional
probability at least p interact exclusively with types in that set. It thus provides a measure
of the “cohesiveness” of a set of types. We show that this operator quantiﬁes players’
7Monderer and Samet (1996) study the related question under what conditions two information partitions
are close in a strategic sense. That is, they ﬁx the probability distribution over the states and vary players’
information partitions. Milgrom and Weber (1985) study upper hemicontinuity of the Bayesian equilibrium
correspondence.
8Kets (2007b) studies the same question as Kajii and Morris (1998) for the class of Bayesian network
games, and obtains results that are analogous to those of Kajii and Morris (1998).
9Also see Rothschild (2005).
6higher order beliefs regarding local events in network games, i.e., a player’s beliefs about his
neighbors’ beliefs about their neighbors’ beliefs, and so on.
The local p-belief operator is closely related to the p-belief operator of Monderer and
Samet (1989), which quantiﬁes players’ higher order beliefs in Bayesian games. While the
p-belief operator of Monderer and Samet (1989) can be used to characterize players’ higher
order beliefs over the global structure of the network, the local p-belief operator is well
suited to characterize players’ higher order beliefs over local events. Interestingly, the local
p-belief operator is also related to the neighborhood operator of Morris (1997, 2000). Morris
introduces the neighborhood operator in the context of games on a ﬁxed network. For a
given network, the neighborhood operator assigns to each subset of players the set of players
in that subset for whom at least proportion p of their interactions is only with players in
that subset. That is, the neighborhood operator relates to the cohesiveness of a group of
players, just like the local p-belief operator relates to the cohesiveness of a set of types.
Hence, the local p-belief operator shares features of both the p-belief operator of Monderer
and Samet (1989) and the neighborhood operator of Morris (1997, 2000). Like the p-belief
operator, the local p-belief operator pertains to players’ (higher order) beliefs in incomplete
information games. Like the neighborhood operator, the local p-belief operator refers to the
local interactions of players.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Preliminaries are discussed in Section 2. In
Section 3, we introduce the class of network games of incomplete information. The local p-
belief operator and players’ higher order beliefs in network games are discussed in Section 4.
Section 5 contains our main result and a discussion of its implications. Section 6 concludes.
Appendix A contains the proofs which are not included in the main text.
2 Preliminaries
A network g is a pair consisting of a ﬁnite, nonempty set V (g) of vertices and a ﬁnite
set E(g) of edges, with an edge being an unordered pair of two distinct vertices. Let g
be a network. If {v,w} ∈ E(g), where v,w ∈ V,v 6= w, then v and w are neighbors in
g; alternatively, we say that v and w are adjacent in g. For ease of notation, an edge
{v,w} ∈ E(g) is sometimes denoted by vw.
We consider a setting where the network is drawn from a class of networks according to
some probability distribution. Let n ∈ N, and let V (n) := {1,...,n}. Let G(n) be the set of












Let F be the σ-algebra generated by the set of singletons of G. Let M denote the set of
all probability measures on (G,F), and let µ ∈ M. The probability space (G,F,µ) is a
random network model (Jackson, 2007; Vega-Redondo, 2007). Example 2.1 gives a simple
example of a random network model with a random number of vertices; for a particularly
elegant model of a random network with a random number of vertices, see Bollob´ as et al.
(2007).
Example 2.1 Suppose that a population evolves in (discrete) generations, indexed by m ∈
{0,1,...}. Each member of the mth-generation gives birth to a family (possibly empty) of
members of the (m+1)th generation. The number of oﬀspring that each individual produces
is a random variable, and is independent of the number of oﬀspring of all other individuals.
The probability distribution of the number of oﬀspring is the same for each individual. This
is a simple branching process (e.g. Grimmett and Stirzaker, 1992). If we associate a vertex
with each individual and if we interpret ancestry relations as (undirected) edges, this random
process gives rise to a network with a random number of vertices. /
In the current framework, random network models represent players’ beliefs. Throughout
this paper, we therefore refer to a random network model as a network belief system.
We are interested in the local environment of vertices. Let Q be the (countable) set of all
ﬁnite subsets of N. Let v ∈ V, and deﬁne the function Nv : G → Q by:
∀g ∈ G : Nv(g) := {w ∈ V (g) | vw ∈ E(g)}.
Hence, Nv(g) is the set of neighbors of vertex v in network g. We refer to the measurable
function Nv as the neighborhood of v, and to Nv(g),g ∈ G, as the neighborhood of v in g.
Also, deﬁne the function Dv : G → N ∪ {0} by:
∀g ∈ G : Dv(g) := |Nv(g)|.
That is, Dv(g) is the number of neighbors of vertex v in network g. We refer to Dv(g) as the





Figure 2.1: (a) The network g of Example 2.2; (b) A network isomorphic to g. To see
that this network is isomorphic to g, note that there are two permutations of the vertex
set V (4) = {1,2,3,4} that renders g into this network: π(i) = 5 − i for each i ∈ V (4), or
π0(1) = 4,π0(2) = 3,π0(3) = 1,π0(4) = 2.
v in g can be 0 for two distinct reasons. It could be that v is a vertex in the network, but
does not have any neighbors, or that v is not a vertex of the network.
We also consider the number of neighbors the neighbors of a given vertex have. Loosely
speaking, the neighbor degree proﬁle of a vertex in a given network is a list of the degrees
of the neighbors of the vertex, in a non-increasing order. For t ∈ N, let
Ω
t
K := {(k1,...,kt) ∈ N
t | k1 ≥ k2 ≥ ... ≥ kt−1 ≥ kt}.
For t = 0, let Ωt







Let FK be the σ-ﬁeld generated by the set of singletons of ΩK. For g ∈ G and v ∈ V such
that Dv(g) = 0, we set Kv(g) := 0. Otherwise, deﬁne
N1 := Nv(g),
j(1) := max{w ∈ N1 | Dw(g) ≥ Dz(g) for all z ∈ N1},
Kv,1(g) := Dj(1)(g),
and for ` = 2,...,Dv(g):
N` := N`−1 \ {j(` − 1)},
j(`) := max{w ∈ N` | Dw(g) ≥ Dz(g) for all z ∈ N`},
Kv,`(g) := Dj(`)(g).
Then, Kv(g) := (Kv,1(g),...,Kv,Dv(g)(g)) is the neighbor degree proﬁle of v in g, and the
function Kv : G → ΩK is the neighbor degree proﬁle of v.
9Example 2.2 Suppose we draw network g in Figure 2.1 from the set G. Its vertex set is
V (g) = {1,2,3,4}, and its edge set is E(g) = {{1,2},{1,3},{1,4},{3,4}}. The neighbor-
hood of vertex 1 in g is N1(g) = {2,3,4}, and its degree in g is D1(g) = 3. The neighbor
degree proﬁle of vertex 1 in g is K1(g) = (D4(g),D3(g),D2(g)) = (2,2,1). /
The following deﬁnition will be useful when specifying players’ beliefs in the next section.
Let n ∈ N. Two networks g,g0 ∈ G(n) are isomorphic if there is a permutation π of V (n)
such that {i,j} ∈ E(g) if and only if {π(i),π(j)} ∈ E(g0). This deﬁnes an equivalence
relation; hence, the set of all networks with n vertices G(n) can be partitioned into a ﬁnite
number of isomorphism classes, i.e., sets of isomorphic networks. Let C (n) be the collection
of isomorphism classes of G(n), and let C :=
S
n∈N C (n) be the collection of isomorphism
classes of G. Figure 2.1(a) and (b) depict two networks that are isomorphic.
Throughout this paper, we make the following two assumptions on network belief systems:
Assumption 1 (Finite expected number of vertices) The network belief system (G,F,µ)








Assumption 2 (No isolated vertices) The network belief system (G,F,µ) is such that
with probability 1, each vertex has at least one neighbor. That is,
µ({g ∈ G | Di(g) > 0 for all i ∈ V (g)}) = 1. /
Assumption 2 is for notational convenience only and can easily be relaxed.
3 Network games of incomplete information
A network game of incomplete information is a game on a network, in which players are
associated with a vertex in the network, and each player’s payoﬀ depends on the types and
actions of himself and his neighbors. Players have incomplete information on the network:
they have a common prior over the class G of all ﬁnite networks, and they know the number
of neighbors they have, i.e., their degree. In particular, they may not know the number
of players in the network. Here we introduce the class of network games of incomplete
information.
103.1 Game
Let (G,F,µ) be a network belief system satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2. A network
g ∈ G is drawn according to (G,F,µ). Each vertex in the set V (g) represents a player, and
we refer to a player by his vertex label. Players do not know their vertex label, however.10
Each player i ∈ V (g) knows the number of neighbors he has in the network: his type is his
degree. Hence, the type set is T = N ∪ {0}. Henceforth, we will speak of type and neighbor
type proﬁle, rather than of degree and neighbor degree proﬁle. Each player is endowed with
a ﬁnite, nonempty set A of pure strategies or actions. For each t ∈ T, the payoﬀs of a
player of type t are given by a function vt. For t = 0, vt is a real function on A, i.e., the
payoﬀs to an isolated player only depend on his own action. For t > 0, vt is a function from
A × At × T t to R that is symmetric in At and T t, i.e., for all permutations π on {1,...,t},


















the payoﬀs to a player of type t with neighbor type proﬁle
(θ1,...,θt) when he chooses action a ∈ A, and his neighbors play according to the action
proﬁle (a1,...,at).
Deﬁnition 3.1 A network game of incomplete information is a tuple
hT,A,(G,F,µ),(vt)t∈Ti
with its elements deﬁned as above.
We ﬁx the action set A. A network game of incomplete information is then fully characterized
by the common prior on (G,F) and its proﬁle of payoﬀ functions. We henceforth denote a
network game of incomplete information hT,A,(G,F,µ),(vt)t∈Ti by the pair (µ,v), where
v := (vt)t∈T.
Let B ∈ R. A proﬁle v of payoﬀ functions is bounded by B if for all t ∈ T,t 6= 0, θ ∈ Ωt
K







If there exists B ∈ R such that the proﬁle v is bounded by B, we say that it is bounded.
10The vertex labelling is introduced merely to be able to deﬁne random variables such as the degree of
vertices. However, the labelling is completely arbitrary and carries no meaning.
11(a) (b)
Figure 3.1: The networks of Example 3.2. (a) The network g(3); (b) The network g(300).
As in games with population uncertainty and random-player games, the player set is not
commonly known, so that players are not aware of the particular identities of the other
players in the game. Hence, we cannot assign a separate strategy to each individual player.
Rather, a strategy can only depend on a player’s type (cf. Myerson, 1998; Milchtaich, 2004).
Hence, for each type t ∈ T, let σt be a real function deﬁned on A which satisﬁes
σt(a) ≥ 0
for all a ∈ A, and X
a∈A
σt(a) = 1,
with σt(a) the probability that a player of type t chooses action a. The set of all probability
distributions on A is denoted by Σ. An element σ = (σ0,σ1,σ2,...) ∈ ΣT is referred to as a
strategy function.
3.2 Beliefs
To calculate expected payoﬀs, we need to specify players’ beliefs. There are two notable
issues. Firstly, as in games with population uncertainty and random-player games, players
condition on their type, as well as on the fact that they are selected to play. That is, from a
player’s perspective, even if all networks in the support of µ have equal probability ex ante,
he believes that he is more likely to belong to a network with many players: there are simply
more vertices to be associated with in large networks (cf. Myerson, 1998; Milchtaich, 2004).
This is illustrated in Example 3.2.
Secondly, a player cannot distinguish between networks in a given isomorphism class,
as he does not know his vertex label or the vertex labels of his opponents. Hence, to
calculate players’ beliefs that they have a given neighbor type proﬁle, we need to consider
the probability distribution over isomorphism classes induced by µ, and for each isomorphism
class, we need to take into account the number of vertices with that neighbor type proﬁle in
the isomorphism class.
12Example 3.2 Suppose that the network belief system assigns probability 1
2 to the network
g(3) consisting of a triangle of three players, and probability 1
2 to the network g(300) consisting
of 300 players, connected in a cycle (see Figure 3.1). Though the prior probability of the two
networks is 1
2, from the perspective of a player, it is much more likely that network g(300) is
realized, as to each “player position” in g(3), there are 100 player positions in g(300). Using












Formally, recall that C is the collection of isomorphism classes of G, and that FK is the
σ-ﬁeld associated with the set of all neighbor type proﬁles ΩK. For each C ∈ C, and each
F ∈ FK, let nC(F) be the number of vertices in a network in C with their neighbor type
proﬁle in F. Note that nC(F) is well deﬁned: for any two networks g,g0 ∈ C, the number of








be the expected number of players in the network belief system. By Assumption 1, ¯ n is
ﬁnite. Consider a player who is called upon to play, but who does not know his type yet.







where we recall that µ(C) is the prior probability that a network from the isomorphism class
C is realized. In words, qµ(F) is equal to the expected fraction of players with a neighbor
type proﬁle in F. We refer to qµ(F) as the prior probability that a player’s neighbor type




denotes the prior probability that a player’s type is t. It can be readily checked from the
deﬁnitions that qµ is indeed a probability measure on the measurable space (ΩK,FK) of
neighbor type proﬁles:





























Figure 3.2: The networks representing the isomorphism classes of Example 3.3 that have
positive probability.










Example 3.3 demonstrates how players’ beliefs are calculated in the current framework.
Example 3.3 Suppose that a network belief system assigns positive probability only to the
networks g1,g2,...,g5 in Figure 3.2 or to networks isomorphic to them. Suppose that all
isomorphism classes associated with the networks in Figure 3.2 have equal probability, i.e.,
for each isomorphism class C ∈ C of G, µ(C) = 1
5 if there is a network g ∈ {g1,g2,...,g5}
such that g ∈ C, and µ(C) = 0 otherwise. To calculate a player’s prior belief that his
neighbor type proﬁle is in some set F ∈ FK, we now simply need to count the number of
vertices in g1,...,g5 with their neighbor type proﬁle in F, and compare this to the total
number of vertices in g1,...,g5. For instance, a player’s prior belief that his neighbor type
proﬁle is θ = (2,2) is given by
qµ(θ) =
1
5 · 5 + 1
5 · 3
4 · 1






and a player’s prior belief that his type is t = 2 is qµ(t) = 9
24. This is intuitive: from a player’s
perspective, he is equally likely to be associated with each of the vertices in g1,...,g5. /
Conditional probabilities can be calculated in the usual way. Let t ∈ T be such that qµ(t) > 0.















With minor abuse of notation, we write qµ(θ|t) to denote qµ({θ}|t) for θ ∈ ΩK. We refer to
qµ(F|t) as the conditional belief of (a player of) type t that his neighbor type proﬁle is in F.
14Example 3.3 (continued) To calculate a player’s conditional belief that his neighbor type
proﬁle is in some set F ∈ FK given that his type is t ∈ T, we need to count the number
of vertices in g1,...,g5 with type t and neighbor type proﬁle in F, and compare this to the
total number of vertices in g1,...,g5 with type t. For instance, a player’s conditional belief
that his neighbor type proﬁle is θ = (2,2) given that his type is t = 2 is
qµ(θ|t) =
1
5 · 5 + 1
5 · 3
1
5 · 5 + 1






Indeed, eight out of the nine vertices in g1,...,g5 with type t = 2 have neighbor type proﬁle
θ = (2,2). /
Remark 3.4 Tacitly we have assumed that there is some pool of candidate players from
which (actual) players are drawn. We have not speciﬁed this pool, nor have we speciﬁed the
method by which players are selected. There is no need to specify this, however, as we are
solely interested in players’ beliefs given that they have been selected to play. Hence, the
probability measure qµ gives the probability that an arbitrary player has a certain neighbor
type proﬁle. Also see Myerson (1998, pp. 382–384) on this point. /
3.3 Payoﬀs and equilibrium
Now that we have calculated players’ beliefs, we can deﬁne expected payoﬀs. Let t ∈
T,t 6= 0, θ = (θ1,...,θt) ∈ Ωt




















For each type t ∈ T such that qµ(t) > 0, the expected payoﬀs to a player of type t of an






For t ∈ T such that qµ(t) = 0, set ϕt(a,σ;µ) := 0 for all a ∈ A and σ ∈ ΣT. Also, for each










15The type-averaged payoﬀ of a strategy function σ ∈ ΣT is the weighted average of the
expected payoﬀs of the diﬀerent types under the strategy function σ, and gives the expected
payoﬀ of a player who is called upon to play the game, but does not know his type yet.
Hence, the expected payoﬀs of a type correspond to the interim expected payoﬀs of a player
in standard Bayesian games, while the type-averaged payoﬀs correspond to the ex ante
expected payoﬀs in Bayesian games.
Deﬁnition 3.5 Let ε ≥ 0. A strategy function σ ∈ ΣT is an ε-equilibrium of a network
game of incomplete information (µ,v) if for each t ∈ T such that qµ(t) > 0, for each action
a ∈ A such that σt(a) > 0,
ϕt(a,σ;µ) ≥ ϕt(b,σ;µ) − ε
for all b ∈ A. We refer to a 0-equilibrium as an equilibrium.
Proposition 3.6 Let (µ,v) be a network game of incomplete information. If the proﬁle of
payoﬀ functions v is bounded, the game has an equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Let (µ,v) be a network game of incomplete information. Then, N ε(µ,v) denotes the set
of ε-equilibria of (µ,v). In particular, N 0(µ,v) denotes the set of equilibria of (µ,v).
4 The local p-belief operator and higher order beliefs
Let µ ∈ M, and let p ∈ [0,1]. The local p-belief operator Bp
µ associates with each set
of types the subset of types that with conditional probability at least p interact exclusively
with types in that set (whenever they have positive probability). Formally, let S ⊆ T. Then,
B
p
µ(S) := {t ∈ S | qµ(t) > 0 ⇒ qµ(S
t|t) ≥ p}. (4.1)
Note that Bp





µ(S) ⊇ S, (4.2)
we say that the set of types S is p-closed (under µ).11 If a set of types is p-closed, then each
type in the set interacts with high conditional probability only with types in that set, who
in turn interact with high conditional probability only with types in that set, and so on.
11We follow the convention in the literature on higher order beliefs of making the one-sided implications
explicit, as it is the one-sided implication in (4.2) that captures the nature of a set being p-closed.







is the set of types t ∈ Bp
µ(S) such that with conditional probability at least p,
they interact exclusively with types in Bp
µ(S), that is, with types in S that with conditional




1 (S) := Bp
µ(S) and,




















be the set of types that with conditional probability at least p interact exclusively with types
that with conditional probability at least p...interact exclusively with types in S, for any
number of iterations.
Example 3.3 (continued) Let S := {1,2,3}. It is easy to check that the conditional
belief of a player with type t = 1 or t = 2 that he interacts exclusively with players with
types in S is qµ(St|t) = 1, while the conditional belief of a player with type t = 3 that he





3. Hence, for p ∈ [0, 1
3],
we have Bp
µ(S) = S, while for p ∈ (1
3,1], it holds that Bp
µ(S) = {1,2}. Now consider the
conditional beliefs of players with types in the set Bp
µ(S) that they only interact with players
with a type in Bp
µ(S). For instance, for p ∈ (1












= 1. Hence, for p ∈ (1
3, 2
3), it holds that Bp
µ(Bp
µ(S)) = {1,2}, while for
p ∈ (2
3,1], we have Bp
µ(Bp
µ(S)) = {2}. /
The local p-belief operator satisﬁes the following desirable properties:12
Monotonicity: For any T 0,T 00 ⊆ T, if T 0 ⊆ T 00, then Bp
µ(T 0) ⊆ Bp
µ(T 00).
Continuity: Let S ⊆ T, and for k ∈ N, let Tk ⊆ T. If Tk ↓ S, i.e., if (Tk)k∈N is a (weakly)
decreasing sequence and
T
k∈N Tk = S, then Bp
µ(Tk) ↓ Bp
µ(S).
Continuity in p: If pk ↑ p, then, for any S ⊆ T, Bpk
µ (S) ↓ Bp
µ(S).
For proofs, see Appendix A.
The following two results, which we will use later on, have well-known counterparts in
the literature on higher order beliefs (Monderer and Samet, 1989, Prop. 3).
Lemma 4.1 Let S ⊆ T, and let p ∈ [0,1]. The set of types Cp












12See Monderer and Samet (1989, 1996) for a discussion. Note that the axiom of monotonicity implies the








17Lemma 4.2 Let p ∈ [0,1]. Let t ∈ T, and let T 0 ⊆ T. We have that t ∈ Cp
µ(T 0) if and only
if there exists a subset of types S ⊆ T 0 that is p-closed such that t ∈ S and S ⊆ Bp
µ(T 0).
The proofs of Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 can be found in Appendix A.
Though at ﬁrst sight the local p-belief operator seems to refer primarily to the “cohesiveness”
of a set of types, we can use the local p-belief operator to characterize players’ higher order
beliefs, i.e., the beliefs players have over the beliefs of other players over the beliefs of other
players, and so on. For instance, consider the set Bp
µ(S) of types for some S ⊆ T. We
have said that with conditional probability at least p, a player with type t ∈ Bp
µ(S) interacts
exclusively with players whose types lie in S. An alternative formulation is that a player with
a type t ∈ Bp
µ(S) believes, given his type, that with probability at least p, all his neighbors
have their types in the set S. That is, the local p-belief operator is a belief operator in
the sense of Monderer and Samet (1989) restricted to events of the form “the types of all
neighbors of an arbitrary player are in a given set”. For a discussion of the relation between
the p-belief operator of Monderer and Samet and the local p-belief operator, see Kets (2007a).
A player with a type in Bp
µ(S) for some S ⊆ T believes that with conditional probability
at least p, the types of all his neighbors are in S. When the local p-belief operator is
iterated, we obtain statements about players’ higher order beliefs. When t ∈ Bp
µ(Bp
µ(S)),
a player with type t believes (with conditional probability at least p) that his neighbors
believe that their neighbors’ types are in S, i.e., the set Bp
µ(Bp
µ(S)) characterizes a player’s




µ(S))), a player believes that his neighbors believe that their neighbors believe
that their neighbors’ types are in S. That is, the set Bp
µ(Bp
µ(Bp
µ(S))) characterizes a player’s
beliefs about his neighbors’ beliefs about their neighbors’ beliefs about their neighbors (see
Figure 4.1(b)).
The local p-belief operator also allows us to characterize a player’s beliefs over others’
beliefs about himself and his beliefs. Indeed, a player is a neighbor of his neighbors, so that
when a player believes (with high conditional probability) that his neighbors believe that
their neighbors’ types are in S (i.e., a player’s type is in Bp
µ(Bp
µ(S))), then he believes that
the players he interacts with believe that his type is in S. Similarly, if a player believes that
his neighbors believe that their neighbors believe that their neighbors’ types are in S (i.e.,
a player’s type is in Bp
µ(Bp
µ(Bp
µ(S)))), then he believes that his neighbors believe that he
believes that their types are in S.
We will use the local p-belief operator extensively in the next section to analyze players’
beliefs in network games of incomplete information.
18i
Player i believes that
i
his neighbors believe that
(a)
i
their neighbors’ types lie in S.
i
Player i believes that
i
his neighbors believe that
i
their neighbors believe that
(b)
i
their neighbors’ types lie in S.







Then, with conditional probability at least p, he believes that his neighbors have a type in S,
and that with conditional probability at least p, they believe that their neighbors’ types lie in









. Then, with conditional probability at
least p, he believes that his neighbors have a type in S, and that with conditional probability
at least p, they believe that their neighbors have a type in S, and that with conditional
probability at least p, they believe that their neighbors’ types lie in S.
5 Strategic convergence
5.1 Main result
We want to quantify the extent to which priors are similar in a strategic sense. To that
aim, we deﬁne a measure on the set of priors such that if two priors are close according to
this measure, then, for each network game of incomplete information, for each equilibrium
of the game in which beliefs are given by one of these priors, there exists an approximate
equilibrium of the game with the other prior, such that type-averaged payoﬀs are close in
both equilibria. If that is the case, then, for each possible proﬁle of payoﬀ functions, each
player who is called upon to play can obtain approximately the same payoﬀs (in an ex ante
sense) under both priors: from a player’s (ex ante) perspective, the two priors are similar.
We want to ﬁnd the weakest conditions that guarantees that the above holds.
Formally, let µ,µ0 ∈ M, and let v := (vt)t∈T be a proﬁle of payoﬀ functions. For each









where Φ is the type-averaged payoﬀ given proﬁle v of payoﬀ functions. Hence, χ(µ,µ0;v,ε)
19is a measure of the diﬀerence in outcomes under µ and µ0 in terms of type-averaged payoﬀs.
That is, for a given ε ≥ 0, for each equilibrium under µ, we ﬁrst ﬁnd an ε-equilibrium under µ0
which minimizes the (absolute) diﬀerence in type-averaged payoﬀs under both equilibria, and
we then look for the equilibrium under µ which maximizes this diﬀerence. This formalizes
the idea that for each equilibrium of the network game of incomplete information with
one prior, there exists some approximate equilibrium of the network game of incomplete
information with the other prior, such that type-averaged payoﬀs are similar under both
equilibria. However, the function χ(µ,µ0;v,ε) is not symmetric in µ and µ0, as we would






We refer to χ∗(µ,µ0;v,ε) as the strategic distance between µ and µ0 for the proﬁle v given
ε. The supremum of χ∗(µ,µ0;v,ε) over v is called the strategic distance between µ and µ0
given ε.
Note that when ε increases, the set of approximate equilibria weakly increases, as more
and more strategies will satisfy the equilibrium criterion, and the (absolute) diﬀerence in
type-averaged expected payoﬀs will decrease weakly. Hence, the interesting case is when ε
comes arbitrarily close to 0. This leads us to the following deﬁnition (cf. Kajii and Morris,
1998):
Deﬁnition 5.1 Take any µ ∈ M, and consider a sequence (µk)k∈N in M. The sequence
(µk)k∈N converges strategically to µ if for each proﬁle v of payoﬀ functions that is bounded,






A natural requirement for strategic convergence is that priors attach similar probabilities to
the event that a player has a neighbor type proﬁle in a certain set, i.e., that priors converge




|qµ(F) − qµ0(F)|. (5.1)
We also need to consider players’ conditional beliefs, i.e., the beliefs they have over their











|qµ(F|t) − qµ0(F|t)| ≤ δ
)
(5.2)
20be the set of types such that players’ conditional beliefs on their neighbors’ types are within
δ, whenever the type has positive probability under µ and µ0. If δ is small, the conditional
beliefs of a player with a type t ∈ T δ
µ,µ0 over the types of his neighbors are close under µ
and µ0. If a player has a type t 6∈ T δ
µ,µ0, then his optimal actions under µ and µ0 may diﬀer
substantially, as he believes that his local environment is very diﬀerent under µ and µ0.
However, even if with high (prior) probability, a player has a type such that his conditional
beliefs on his neighbors’ types are similar under µ and µ0 (i.e., t ∈ T δ
µ,µ0), outcomes can be very
diﬀerent under the two priors. The reason is that a player may believe with high conditional
probability that the conditional beliefs of some of his neighbors on their neighbors’ types
are very diﬀerent under µ and µ0 (i.e., t 6∈ Bp
µ(T δ
µ,µ0) for some p ∈ [0,1]), or that some of his
neighbors believe with high conditional probability that the conditional beliefs of some of







), and so on. Hence,
we need to require that with high probability, a player has a type in the set Cp
µ(T δ
µ,µ0), for some
large p ∈ [0,1]. In that case, a player’s conditional beliefs are similar under µ and µ0, and,
he believes with high conditional probability that the conditional beliefs of his neighbors are
similar under the two priors and that his neighbors believe with high conditional probability
that the conditional beliefs of their neighbors are similar under the two priors, and so on.
This makes that the actions that are optimal for a player of type t ∈ Cp
µ(T δ
µ,µ0) under µ
will be (almost) optimal under µ0, as he expects his neighbors to behave similarly under µ
and µ0 (as his neighbors expect their neighbors to behave similarly, as the neighbors of his
neighbors expect their neighbors...).







be the set of neighbor type proﬁles in which the type of the “central” player belongs to the












≥ 1 − δ
	
. (5.3)
If d1(µ,µ0) is small, then, with high prior probability (under µ), a player has a type such
that his conditional beliefs are similar under µ and µ0, and with high conditional probability,
he interacts exclusively with players whose conditional beliefs are close, and who, with high
conditional probability, interact exclusively with players whose conditional beliefs are close,
and so on.
Remark 5.2 One may think that requiring that with high prior probability, a player has a
type in Cp
µ(T δ
µ,µ0) may not be suﬃcient: Even if a player believes, given his type, that with
21high probability his neighbors will choose the same actions under µ and µ0 (allowing for
ε-best responses), they may not do so if in fact their type is not in Cp
µ(T δ
µ,µ0)! That is, if with
high probability, some of the neighbors of a player have a type t 6∈ Cp
µ(T δ
µ,µ0), the payoﬀ to a
player with type t ∈ Cp
µ(T δ
µ,µ0) can be very diﬀerent under µ and µ0.13 However, Lemma 5.4
below shows that, if the probability is high that a player has a type in the set Cp
µ(T δ
µ,µ0), then
in fact also the probability that his neighbors have a type in Cp
µ(T δ
µ,µ0) will be high. Hence,
it is suﬃcient to require that with high probability, a player has a type in Cp
µ(T δ
µ,µ0). /







It is immediate that d∗ is nonnegative and symmetric. Moreover, d∗(µ,µ0) = 0 if and only
if µ = µ0. However, d∗ need not satisfy the triangle inequality, so that it is not a metric.
However, d∗ generates a topology on the set M of probability measures on (G,F): a sequence
(µk)k∈N converges to µ if and only if for any ε > 0, there exists Kε ∈ N such that d∗(µk,µ) ≤ ε
for all k > Kε.
We are now ready to state our main result.
Theorem 5.3 Let µ ∈ M and let (µk)k∈N be a sequence in M. Then, (µk)k∈N converges






Theorem 5.3 follows from Proposition 5.6 - 5.8. Proposition 5.6 uses Lemma 5.4 and
Lemma 5.5.
Lemma 5.4 Let µ ∈ M, and ﬁx α,p ∈ [0,1]. For each S ⊆ T, if the probability that a
player has a type in the set Cp










then the probability that this player and his neighbors have their types in Cp













Proof. See Appendix A. 
13Indeed, Kajii and Morris (1998) require that the prior probability that all players have close conditional
beliefs should be high.
22Lemma 5.5 Let µ,µ0 ∈ M, and let δ ∈ [0,1]. Let v be a proﬁle of payoﬀ functions. If
σ ∈ ΣT is an equilibrium of the game (µ,v) and if v is bounded by B, then there exists a
5δB-equilibrium σ0 of the game (µ0,v), with σ0




Proof. For ease of notation, deﬁne Q := C
1−δ
µ0 (T δ
µ,µ0). For each t ∈ Q, set σ0
t = σt. For t 6∈ Q
such that qµ0(t) > 0, let σ0
t be such that (σ0
t)t∈T is an equilibrium of the reduced game where
each player with a type t ∈ Q is required to play σ0
t = σt. Such an equilibrium exists by
Proposition 3.6. By construction, σ0
t is a best response to σ0 for t 6∈ Q. Hence, it remains to
show that σ0
t is a 5δB-best response for a type t ∈ Q. Hence, let t ∈ Q such that qµ(t) > 0






≥ 1 − δ. (5.5)
Furthermore, by the deﬁnition of Q = C
1−δ
µ0 (T δ
µ,µ0), for each F ∈ FK,
|qµ(F|t) − qµ0(F|t)| ≤ δ. (5.6)



































  < δB. (5.8)
To evaluate the second sum in (5.7), ﬁrst note that for θ ∈ Qt, all neighbors play according





























 vt(a,σ(θ)) − vt(b,σ(θ))
  ≤ 2δB. (5.11)
23Let P t := {θ ∈ Qt | qµ0(θ|t) − qµ(θ|t) ≥ 0} be the set of neighbor type proﬁles θ in Qt such





















 ≤ 2δB. (5.12)























 ≤ 4δB. (5.13)





0)| ≤ 5δB. 
Proposition 5.6 establishes the suﬃciency of the condition in Theorem 5.3.
Proposition 5.6 Let µ,µ0 ∈ M, and let δ ∈ [0,1]. Let v be a proﬁle of payoﬀ functions.
Suppose that d∗(µ,µ0) ≤ δ. Then, if σ is an equilibrium of the game (µ,v) and v is bounded








Proof. For ease of notation, deﬁne Q := C
1−δ
µ0 (T δ
µ,µ0). As d∗(µ,µ0) ≤ δ,
|qµ(F) − qµ0(F)| ≤ δ (5.14)





≥ 1 − δ. (5.15)
Let σ ∈ ΣT be an equilibrium of (µ,v). By Lemma 5.5, there exists a 5δB-equilibrium
σ0 ∈ ΣT of (µ0,v) such that σ0
t = σt for all t ∈ Q. Hence, using (5.15) and Lemma 5.4 (with


































































Deﬁne the function ζ : ΩK → T by ζ(θ) = t whenever θ ∈ Ωt
K. That is, the function ζ gives
the type of a player for each possible neighbor type proﬁle he may have. Let P := {θ ∈ ΩK |



















Combining (5.16) and (5.16) gives the desired result. 
We now establish necessity. Proposition 5.7 establishes that d0(µ,µ0) should be small for
strategic outcomes to be similar (in the sense deﬁned above).
Proposition 5.7 Let δ ∈ [0,1], and let µ,µ0 ∈ M. If
d0(µ,µ
0) > δ,
then there exists a proﬁle v of payoﬀ functions with bound B = 1 and an equilibrium σ of




Proof. If d0(µ,µ0) > δ, there exists a set of neighbor type proﬁles F ∈ FK such that





1 if θ ∈ F,
0 otherwise.




for any two strategy functions σ,σ0 ∈ ΣT. 
Proposition 5.8 establishes that strategic outcomes can be very diﬀerent if d1(µ,µ0) is
large.
Proposition 5.8 Let δ ∈ [0,1], and let µ,µ0 ∈ M. If
d1(µ,µ
0) > δ,
then there exists a proﬁle v of payoﬀ functions with bound B = 3 and an equilibrium σ of
























> 1 − δ. (5.16)
Without loss of generality, assume that (5.16) holds. Recall that for each t 6∈ T δ
µ,µ0, there
exists a set of neighbor type proﬁles Ft ∈ FK such that
qµ0(Ft|t) − qµ(Ft|t) > δ.
Write A = {b1,b2,...,bm}, where m ∈ N, and let payoﬀs be deﬁned as follows.14 For each









    
    
2 if t ∈ T δ
µ,µ0 and a
(t)
j = b2 for some j ∈ {1,...,t},
−δ if t ∈ T δ
µ,µ0 and a
(t)
j = b1 for all j ∈ {1,...,t},
1 − qµ(Ft|t) if t 6∈ T δ
µ,µ0 and θ ∈ Ft,
−qµ(Ft|t) if t 6∈ T δ
µ,µ0 and θ 6∈ Ft,




14This game is based on the “infection game” of Kajii and Morris (1998).
26Hence, action b1 always gives a payoﬀ of 0, regardless of the actions and types of a player
and his neighbors. For players with type t ∈ T δ
µ,µ0, action b2 is only proﬁtable if there is at
least one neighbor who also takes action b2. By contrast, the payoﬀs of b2 to players with
type t 6∈ T δ
µ,µ0 only depends on their neighbor type proﬁle θ: action b2 is proﬁtable only if θ
belongs to Ft. All other actions than b1 and b2 are strictly dominated.
Consider the network game of incomplete information (µ,v). In this game, there is an
equilibrium σ ∈ ΣT in which all types t ∈ T choose action b1 with probability 1. For each
type t, expected payoﬀs are 0, so that type-averaged payoﬀs are 0. Now consider the game
(µ0,v). By deﬁnition, for each type t 6∈ T δ
µ,µ0, qµ0(Ft|t) − qµ(Ft|t) > δ. The interim expected












for any strategy function σ ∈ ΣT. Hence, in any δ-equilibrium, players with type t 6∈ T δ
µ,µ0
will play action b2. Let ˆ T δ
µ,µ0 := {t ∈ T δ
µ,µ0 | qµ(t) > 0} be the set of types in T δ
µ,µ0 that have






< 1−δ, then, with conditional
probability at least δ, a player with type t has at least one neighbor who plays b2. Hence,
the interim expected payoﬀs of b2 to such a type are at least
δ · 2 − (1 − δ) · δ > δ,
so that in any δ-equilibrium, players with type t ∈ ˆ T δ





< 1 − δ will
play b2. By a similar argument, players with type t ∈ ˆ T δ









1 − δ will play b2 in any δ-equilibrium. This argument can be iterated any ﬁnite number of
times. Consequently, all players with type t ∈ ˆ T δ








< 1 − δ
will play b2 in any δ-equilibrium.
By (5.16), the probability that a player has a type t 6∈ Cµ0(T δ
µ,µ0) is greater than δ. As
by Lemma 4.1 the set C
1−δ
µ0 (T δ
µ,µ0) is (1 − δ)-closed, the probability that a player has a type
t ∈ ˆ T δ








< 1−δ is greater than δ. Hence, in any δ-equilibrium





We can now prove Theorem 5.3.
Proof. (If) Let v be a proﬁle of payoﬀ functions. By Proposition 5.6, for v bounded by B,












27Hence, for all proﬁles of payoﬀ functions v that are bounded and for all ε > 0, if d∗(µ,µk) → 0,
then χ∗(µ,µk;v,ε) → 0.
(Only if) Let µ,µ0 ∈ M. For δ ∈ [0,1), if d0(µ,µ0) > δ or d1(µ,µ0) > δ, then, by
Propositions 5.7 and 5.8, there exists a proﬁle of payoﬀ functions v bounded by B = 3
and an equilibrium σ ∈ ΣT of (µ,v) such that for any δ-equilibrium σ0 ∈ ΣT of (µ0,v),
|Φ(σ;µ) − Φ(σ0;µ0)| > δ2. 
Remark 5.9 In the current setting, all players with the same payoﬀ function independently
implement the same strategy, i.e., strategies do not depend on a player’s identity. This does
not drive our results. We study the continuity of a given equilibrium correspondence; whether
the equilibrium is deﬁned in terms of deviations of individual players or of types, is irrelevant
for the question we study. Secondly, Kets (2007b) shows that a counterpart of Theorem 5.3
holds for Bayesian network games (where the player set is ﬁxed and strategies may depend on
a player’s identity) when one deﬁnes strategic convergence in terms of symmetric Bayesian
ε-equilibria (see Kajii and Morris (1998) for a similar result for Bayesian games). /
Remark 5.10 Our deﬁnition of strategic closeness requires that type-averaged expected
payoﬀs be close in equilibria under two priors. An alternative notion would require that
with high probability, a player and his neighbors follow the same strategies under the two
priors (cf. Monderer and Samet, 1996). Indeed, from the proof of Proposition 5.6, it follows
that for two priors µ,µ0 ∈ M, if d∗(µ,µ0) ≤ δ for some δ ∈ [0,1], and σ ∈ ΣT is an equilibrium
of (µ,v) for a proﬁle v bounded by B, then there is a 5δB-equilibrium of (µ0,v) such that
the prior probability (either under µ or µ0) that a player or his neighbors have a type t ∈ T
such that σ0
t 6= σt is at most δ(2−δ). However, this alone does not imply that the two priors
µ and µ0 give similar outcomes from a player’s ex ante perspective: one should also consider
the diﬀerence in prior probabilities under µ and µ0. This is done in the last step of the proof
of Proposition 5.6. Hence, the appropriate deﬁnition of strategic closeness in the current
setting considers diﬀerences in type-average expected payoﬀs. /
Remark 5.11 Our deﬁnition of strategic convergence requires that players choose approx-
imate best responses given their type. If, alternatively, we would only have required that
they choose approximate best responses before learning their type, i.e., if we would have con-
sidered some ex ante or type-averaged notion of approximate equilibrium, then convergence
in the weak topology on ΩK (i.e., d0(µ,µk) → 0) is necessary and suﬃcient for strategic
convergence, see Theorem A.9 in Appendix A. /
28Remark 5.12 We allow for a player’s payoﬀ to depend on the types of his neighbors. Ob-
viously, for the subclass of games in which a player’s payoﬀs do not depend on his neighbors’
types, the conditions we derive for strategic convergence is still suﬃcient, though they may
not be necessary. Our conjecture is that the current conditions cannot be weakened sub-
stantially for this subclass of games. /
Remark 5.13 The assumption that a player’s payoﬀs only depend on the actions and types
of his direct neighbors is not essential. Under some suitable modiﬁcations and some addi-
tional technical assumptions, one could obtain similar results for games in which players’
payoﬀs depend on the actions and types of players that are less than k steps away from them
in the network, for arbitrary k ∈ N. /
We now proceed to discuss the implications of Theorem 5.3 in more detail.
5.2 Conditional beliefs and strategic convergence
Theorem 5.3 shows that it is not suﬃcient if two priors assign similar (prior) probabilities
to all events in the space of neighbor type proﬁles for them to be strategically close. In
addition, it needs to hold that with high probability, a player has a type such that his
conditional beliefs are similar under the two priors, and that he thinks it is likely, given his
type, the conditional beliefs of his neighbors are close, and that they think it is likely, given
their type, ...that the conditional beliefs of their neighbors are similar, for any number of
iterations. In the current section we investigate when this latter condition will be binding.
To shed some light on this, we ﬁrst investigate when this condition plays no role. We
adopt the following deﬁnition from Kajii and Morris (1998):
Deﬁnition 5.14 A prior µ ∈ M is insensitive to small probability events if for each se-









In words, a prior µ ∈ M is insensitive to small probability events if a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for strategic convergence of any sequence (µk)k∈N in M to µ is that d0(µ,µk)
converges to zero when k goes to ∞. The next proposition establishes that a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for a prior to be insensitive to small probability events is that it can be
approximated on a ﬁnite subset of T that is suﬃciently closed:
29Proposition 5.15 A prior µ ∈ M is insensitive to small probability events if and only if
for each ε > 0, there exists a ﬁnite set of types Sε ⊆ T that is (1 − ε)-closed under µ such





≥ 1 − ε.
The proof can be found in Appendix A.
It is easy to see that the following conditions are suﬃcient for a prior µ to be insensitive
to small probability events:
Finite support: The set of types that have positive probability under µ is ﬁnite, i.e.,
|{t ∈ T | qµ(t) > 0}| < ∞;





Perfect correlation over types: Players only interact with players of their own type, i.e.,
for all t ∈ T such that qµ(t) > 0, qµ((t,...,t)|t) = 1, where (t,...,t) is a vector in T
of length t.
One case of interest in which a prior has ﬁnite support is when the number of players is ﬁxed,
as in Bayesian network games. An example of a network belief system with an unbounded
number of players and independent types is given in Example 2.1. Finally, network belief
systems in which types are perfectly correlated are studied by e.g. Ellison (1993).
Proposition 5.15 also gives some insight into the question under which conditions a prior is
most sensitive to small probability events. Consider two priors µ,µ0 ∈ M, and let δ ∈ [0,1].
Suppose that with probability at least 1 − δ, a player has a type t ∈ T δ
µ,µ0, i.e., a type such
that his conditional beliefs under µ and µ0 are within δ. Let Θ0 ⊆ T δ
µ,µ0 be the (possibly
empty) set of types in T δ
µ,µ0 that with high conditional probability interact with types that
do not belong to T δ
µ,µ0, and, for ` = 1,2,..., let Θ` ⊆ (T δ
µ,µ0 \ Θ`−1) be the set of types in
T δ
µ,µ0 \ Θ`−1 that interact with high conditional probability with types that do not belong
to T δ
µ,µ0 \ Θ`−1. If a player has a type in one of the sets Θ`, his own conditional beliefs are
close under the two priors, but, with high conditional probability, he interacts with types
whose conditional beliefs are very diﬀerent under µ and µ0, or who, with high conditionally
probability, interact with types whose conditional beliefs are very diﬀerent under µ and µ0,
and so on. If the probability is high that a player has such a type, then even if it is a
high probability event that a player has a type in T δ
µ,µ0, the probability that he has a type
in C1−δ
µ (T δ










Figure 5.1: Even if with high probability, a player has a type in T δ
µ,µ0, the probability that
he has a type in C1−δ
µ (T δ
µ,µ0) may be small.
among types: a player whose conditional beliefs are similar under µ and µ0 may be induced
to follow a diﬀerent strategy under µ0 than under µ because he thinks it is likely that his
neighbors’ beliefs are diﬀerent, or that they think that their neighbors’ beliefs are diﬀerent,
and so on. Note that contagion is not physical here: players do not have to interact directly
to be “infected” by others’ behavior. It suﬃces that players believe (given their type) that
it is likely that their neighbors believe that ...their neighbors have a certain type.
This situation is ruled out under the following two conditions. The ﬁrst condition is that
the set T δ
µ,µ0 is suﬃciently cohesive, in the sense that all types in T δ
µ,µ0 interact (with high
conditional probability) only with types in T δ
µ,µ0, who in turn interact only with types in
T δ
µ,µ0, and so on. In that case, if it is a high probability event that a player has a type in
T δ
µ,µ0, it will be a high probability event that a player has a type in C1−δ
µ (T δ
µ,µ0).
The second condition is that players’ types are independent. In that case, players’ con-
ditional beliefs play no role: if priors assign similar prior probabilities to all events, then
players’ conditional beliefs will also be similar. Hence, when there is some correlation among
types, but the set T δ
µ,µ0 is not suﬃciently cohesive, players’ conditional beliefs play an im-
portant role so that small probability events can have a large eﬀect on outcomes.
This means that one should be careful in deﬁning the game. In particular, it is often
assumed in the literature on network games that the size of the network is ﬁxed and that
types are independent. The current analysis shows that these assumptions are not innocuous.
If players believe that there is some correlation among types and there is uncertainty about
the size of the network, then priors may be sensitive to small probability events, which is
31not the case when the number of players is ﬁxed or when types are independent.
6 Conclusions
Given the complexity of many networks, it is important to study whether game-theoretic
predictions are robust to assumptions on players’ beliefs and information. We have studied
the robustness of game-theoretic predictions to assumptions on players’ (common) prior in
network games of incomplete information. We have asked under what conditions on two
priors it holds that for any bounded network game of incomplete information in which
players hold one of these priors, for any equilibrium in that game, there is an approximate
equilibrium in the game with the other prior such that ex ante expected payoﬀs are close.
Our main result (Theorem 5.3) shows that two priors are close in a strategic sense if and only
if they assign similar prior probabilities to all events involving a player and his neighbors,
and, in addition, the set of types for which conditional beliefs are similar has high probability,
and is suﬃciently cohesive in the sense that with high conditional probability, a type in that
set interacts only with types in that set that, with high conditional probability, only interact
with types in that set, and so on. This latter condition can also be formulated in terms of
players’ higher order beliefs: with high probability, a player believes, given his type, that
his neighbors’ conditional beliefs are similar under the two priors, and that his neighbors
believe, given their type, that...the conditional beliefs of their neighbors are similar, for any
number of iterations.
An important motivation for this work comes from the realization that networks are often
large and complex. This suggests that is natural to assume that players on a network have
incomplete information about its structure, thus motivating the study of the robustness of
game-theoretic predictions to the speciﬁcation of players’ beliefs on their network. There
seems to be some tension between this motivation and our results. On the one hand, we
assume that players are subject to information constraints. Yet, our results are derived in a
setting where players use sophisticated arguments to form expectations over their opponents’
behavior. However, it can be shown that the same results are obtained (in the limit) when
the game is played repeatedly and to the behavior of his neighbors in the last period (cf.
Jackson and Yariv, 2007; Morris, 2000).
To establish our results, we have used ideas and concepts from the literature on higher
order beliefs. There are other important questions in the setting of network games of in-
complete information that can be answered using ideas from this literature. One important
question is how sensitive game-theoretic predictions are to the assumptions on players’ in-
32formation about the network structure. As in much of the literature on network games,
we have assumed that players only know their degree. Indeed, Friedkin (1983) ﬁnds that
the “observational horizon” of individuals is limited in communication networks in organi-
zations: individuals only know their local environment in the network. However, there is a
large variability among individuals. In addition, players can also represent entities like ﬁrms
or countries, whose horizon is likely to be larger. For these reasons, it is important to inves-
tigate the sensitivity of predictions to informational assumptions. Galeotti, Goyal, Jackson,
Vega-Redondo, and Yariv (2006) study the eﬀect of gradually varying players’ information
about the network in a speciﬁc setting. Their results indicate that informational assumptions
can have an important eﬀect on results. However, to date, there is no systematic investi-
gation how assumptions players’ information aﬀects results. The link with the literature on
higher order beliefs may also be helpful here, as this literature contains numerous results
on the eﬀect of perturbing information structures. The current results suggest that such
robustness questions are important to study in network games of incomplete information,
and they illustrate how one can utilize ideas from the literature on higher order beliefs to
answer such questions.
Appendix A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.6
Proposition 3.6 uses Lemma A.1.
Lemma A.1 Let (µ,v) be a network game of incomplete information such that the proﬁle
v of payoﬀ functions is bounded. For each t ∈ T, let the function ϕt(·;µ) on ΣT be deﬁned
as in (3.2). Then, ϕt(·;µ) is continuous on the (topological) product space ΣT.
Proof. For each t ∈ T and n ∈ N, let
Ω
t,n
K := {(k1,...,kt) ∈ {1,...,n}
t | k1 ≥ k2 ≥ ... ≥ kt−1 ≥ kt}
be the set of neighbor type proﬁles of a player of type t such that the type of each neighbor
is at most n. Clearly, Ω
t,n
K is a ﬁnite subset of the countable set Ωt
K. For each t ∈ T and













if qµ(t) > 0,
0 otherwise.
33For t ∈ T such that qµ(t) = 0, it holds that ϕ
(n)
t (σ;µ) = ϕt(σ;µ) = 0 for all σ ∈ ΣT. Let
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 ≤ ε (A.1)






n∈N converges uniformly on
ΣT to ϕt(·;µ). As for each n ∈ N, the function ϕ
(n)
t (·;µ) is continuous on ΣT, the function
ϕt(·;µ) is continuous on ΣT. 
We are now ready to prove Proposition 3.6. Consider a network game of incomplete
information (µ,v) such that v is bounded, and ﬁx some strategy function τ ∈ ΣT. Let
n ∈ N, and let T (n) := {1,...,n}. Recall the deﬁnition of the function ϕt(·;µ) on ΣT
in (3.2).






t∈T(n)i, where for each t ∈ T (n),
˜ ϕ
(n)
















for all σ(n) ∈ Σn. That is, the payoﬀ of a player t ∈ T (n) in the game G(n) is the expected
payoﬀ of a player of type t in the original game (µ,v), given that players with type t ∈ T\T (n)
play according to τ. The set Σ is a nonempty, convex, compact subset of a ﬁnite-dimensional
Euclidean space, and for each t ∈ T (n), ˜ ϕ
(n)
t (·;µ) is a continuous real-valued function on Σn
that is quasi-concave in σt on Σ. Hence, the best-response correspondence bt : Σn ⇒ Σn
of each player t ∈ T (n) is nonempty, convex-valued, and upper-hemicontinuous, so that by








∈ Σn exists for G(n).











34The set Σ is compact; hence, by the Cantor diagonal method (e.g. Ok, 2007, pp. 197–
198), there exists a subsequence (¯ σ(nj))j∈N of the sequence (¯ σ(n))n∈N that converges to some
¯ σ = (¯ σ1, ¯ σ2,...) ∈ ΣT. We claim that ¯ σ is an equilibrium of the original game (µ,v). Suppose
not. Then there exists t ∈ T and σt ∈ Σ such that
ϕt(¯ σ1, ¯ σ2,..., ¯ σt−1, ¯ σt, ¯ σt+1,...;µ) < ϕt(¯ σ1, ¯ σ2,..., ¯ σt−1,σt, ¯ σt+1,...;µ).
By Lemma A.1, ϕt is continuous on the topological product space ΣT. Hence, there exists





1 ,..., ¯ σ
(nj)






















is a Nash equilibrium of the game G(nj).
A.2 Properties of the local p-belief operator
In this section, we prove the properties of the local p-belief operator as listed in Section 4,
and we prove Lemma 4.1 and 4.2.
Lemma A.2 (Continuity) Let S ⊆ T, and for k ∈ N, let Tk ⊆ T. If Tk ↓ S, i.e., if
(Tk)k∈N is a decreasing sequence and
T
k∈N Tk = S, then Bp
µ(Tk) ↓ Bp
µ(S).
Proof. First note that Bp
µ(Tk+1) ⊆ Bp
µ(Tk) for all k ∈ N, i.e., (Bp
µ(Tk))k∈N is a decreasing













First suppose t ∈
T
k∈N Bp
µ(Tk). Then, obviously, t ∈ Tk for all k ∈ N. We need to distinguish
two cases. First suppose that qµ(t) = 0. Then, by deﬁnition, t ∈ Bp
µ(
T
k∈N Tk). So suppose
qµ(t) > 0. Then, qµ(T t
k|t) ≥ p for all k ∈ N. Furthermore, (T t








































. Then, obviously, t ∈ Tk for all k ∈ N. Again,
we need to consider two cases. If qµ(t) = 0, then it follows directly from the deﬁnition of Bp
µ
that t ∈ Bp
µ(Tk) for all k ∈ N, and therefore t ∈
T
k∈N Bp
µ(Tk). So suppose qµ(t) > 0. Then,
qµ(St|t) ≥ p implies that qµ(Tk|t) ≥ p for all k ∈ N. Hence, t ∈ Bp





Lemma A.3 (Monotonicity) For any T 0,T 00 ⊆ T, if T 0 ⊆ T 00, then Bp
µ(T 0) ⊆ Bp
µ(T 00).


















Lemma A.4 (Continuity in p) If pk ↑ p, then, for any S ⊆ T, Bpk
µ (S) ↓ Bp
µ(S).
















µ (S). If qµ(t) = 0, then it follows directly from the deﬁnition that
t ∈ Bp
µ(S). So suppose qµ(t) > 0. Then, qµ(St|t) ≥ pk for all k ∈ N, and therefore
qµ(St|t) ≥ p. Hence, t ∈ Bp
µ(S).
Conversely, suppose t ∈ Bp




So suppose qµ(t) > 0. Then, qµ(St) ≥ p, and hence qµ(St) ≥ pk for all k ∈ N. We conclude
that t ∈ Bpk




Finally, we present the proofs of Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2.


































































Proof of Lemma 4.2. Suppose t ∈ Cp
µ(T 0). By Lemma 4.1, the set Cp
µ(T 0) is p-closed. Also,
by deﬁnition, Cp
µ(T 0) ⊆ Bp
µ(T 0). Hence, we can set S = Cp
µ(T 0), and the statement follows.












`(T 0) for all ` ∈ N, from which it follows that
t ∈ Cp








`(T 0), then by (A.2) and




















A.3 Proof of Lemma 5.4
By Lemma 4.1, Cp
µ(S) is p-closed. Hence, for all t ∈ Cp




























































Remark A.5 Note that Lemma 5.4 can be generalized: we can replace Cp
µ(S) in the lemma
by any subset of T that is p-closed. We have presented it in its current form for expositional
reasons. /
A.4 Continuity of the type-averaged equilibrium correspondence
In (approximate) equilibrium, players are required to choose best responses given their
type, i.e., equilibrium is deﬁned in terms of expected payoﬀs. Alternatively, we could de-
ﬁne equilibrium in terms of type-averaged expected payoﬀs, allowing types with low prior
probability to follow strategies that are suboptimal. In standard Bayesian games, lower
hemicontinuity of the ex ante ε-equilibrium has been studied by Engl (1995). He shows that
the weak topology is suﬃcient for lower hemicontinuity of the ex ante ε-equilibrium in count-
able state spaces. Here, we derive the analogous result for the type-averaged ε-equilibrium
correspondence (see below for a precise deﬁnition). We show that the weak topology is
suﬃcient (and also necessary) to guarantee lower-hemicontinuity of this correspondence.
First we need some deﬁnitions. Recall the deﬁnition of type-averaged expected payoﬀs
from Section 3.
37Deﬁnition A.6 Let ε ≥ 0. A strategy function σ ∈ ΣT is a type-averaged ε-equilibrium of
a network game of incomplete information (µ,v) if
Φ(σ;µ) ≥ Φ(σ
0;µ) − ε
for all σ0 ∈ Σ. We refer to a type-averaged 0-equilibrium as a type averaged equilibrium.
Proposition A.7 Let (µ,v) be a network game of incomplete information. If the proﬁle of
payoﬀ functions v is bounded, the game has a type-averaged equilibrium.
The proof follows directly from the proof of Proposition 3.6. Let N ε
τ (µ,v) denote the set of
type-averaged ε-equilibria of (µ,v).
We deﬁne a notion of strategic convergence for the current setting. Let µ,µ0 ∈ M, and

















Deﬁnition A.8 Take any µ ∈ M, and consider a sequence (µk)k∈N in M. The sequence
(µk)k∈N converges strategically in a type-averaged sense to µ if for each proﬁle v of payoﬀ







Recall the deﬁnition of d0 from Section 5, and note that the metric d0 generates the weak
topology.
Theorem A.9 Let µ ∈ M and let (µk)k∈N be a sequence in M. Then, (µk)k∈N converges





The proof follows from Proposition A.10 and A.11.
Proposition A.10 establishes that the weak topology is suﬃcient.
Proposition A.10 Let µ,µ0 ∈ M, and let δ ∈ [0,1]. Let v be a proﬁle of payoﬀ functions.
Suppose that d0(µ,µ0) ≤ δ. Then, if σ ∈ ΣT is a type-averaged equilibrium of the game (µ,v)
and if v is bounded by B, then σ is a type-averaged 4δB-equilibrium of the game (µ0,v), and
|Φ(σ;µ) − Φ(σ;µ
0)| ≤ 2δB.
38Proof. Let t ∈ T be such that qµ(t) > 0, and let σ0
t ∈ Σ. As σ is a type-averaged equilibrium
of (µ,v),
Φ(σ










As d0(µ,µ0) ≤ δ,
Φ(σ;µ) − Φ(σ;µ




0) ≥ −2δB. (A.6)





proving the ﬁrst claim. The second claim follows directly from (A.5). 
The next proposition shows that the topology generated by d0 is also necessary.
Proposition A.11 Let δ ∈ [0,1], and let µ,µ0 ∈ M. If
d0(µ,µ
0) > δ,
then there exists a proﬁle v of payoﬀ functions with bound B = 1 and an equilibrium σ of




The proof follows directly from the proof of Proposition 5.7.
We can now prove Theorem A.9.
Proof. (If) Let v be a proﬁle of payoﬀ functions. By Proposition A.10, for v bounded by






Hence, for all proﬁles of payoﬀ functions v that are bounded and for all ε > 0, if d0(µ,µk) → 0,
then χ∗
τ(µ,µk;v,ε) → 0.
(Only if) Let µ,µ0 ∈ M. For δ ∈ [0,1), if d0(µ,µ0) > δ, then, by Proposition A.11, there
exists a proﬁle of payoﬀ functions v bounded by B = 1 and a type-averaged equilibrium
σ ∈ ΣT of (µ,v) such that for any type-averaged δ-equilibrium σ0 ∈ ΣT of (µ0,v), |Φ(σ;µ)−
Φ(σ0;µ0)| > δ. 
39A.5 Proof of Proposition 5.15
Proposition 5.15 uses Lemma A.12.













Proof. Let ε > 0. By assumption, there exists K ∈ N such that for all k > K,
sup
F∈FK



















Let k > K. Recall that for t ∈ T
ε/2
µ,µk such that qµ(t) > 0 and qµk(t) > 0,
sup
F∈FK







µ,µk := {t ∈ T
ε/2
µ,µk | qµ(t) > 0}.
Note that, unlike T
ε/2
µ,µk, the set ˆ T
ε/2
µ,µk is not symmetric in µ and µk, i.e., ˆ T
ε/2
µk,µ 6= ˆ T
ε/2
µ,µk.






















































































≥ 1 − ε.
40Combining these results gives
inf
n








≥ 1 − δ
o
≤ ε. 
We can now prove Proposition 5.15
(If) Let ε > 0, and let (µk)k∈N be a sequence in M. Suppose that Sε ⊆ T is such that








≥ 1 − ε. (A.12)
By Lemma A.12, if d0(µ,µk) → 0 and d1(µ,µk) → 0, then also d1(µk,µ) → 0. Hence, it is
suﬃcient to show that d1(µ,µk) → 0 whenever d0(µ,µk) → 0.
Let ˆ Sε := {t ∈ Sε | qµ(t) > 0} be the set of types in Sε that have positive probability
under µ. By (A.10), there exists c > 0 such that qµ(t) = qµ(Ωt
K) ≥ c for all t ∈ ˆ Sε. Then,
for all k ∈ N, for all t ∈ ˆ Sε,
sup
F∈FK






























 qµ(F ∪ Ω
t























|qµ(F) − qµk(F)|. (A.13)
Suppose that limk→∞ d0(µ,µk) = 0. Then there exists K ∈ N such that for all k > K,
sup
F∈FK





Let k > K. Then, by (A.13), for all t ∈ ˆ Sε such that qµk(t) > 0, it holds that
sup
F∈FK
|qµ(F|t) − qµk(F|t)| ≤ ε,
so that Sε ⊆ T ε
µ,µk. By monotonicity of the local p-belief operator and (A.11),
Sε = B
1−ε









41Using Lemma 4.2 and (A.11), we obtain






















≥ 1 − ε.














First we show that there exists a sequence (νk)k∈N in M such that
(a) for each k ∈ N, the set of types {t ∈ T | qνk(t) > 0} that have positive probability
under νk is ﬁnite;





|qµ(F) − qνk(F)| = 0.
The sequence (νk)k∈N is easy to construct. If µ has ﬁnite support in T, i.e., if the set
{t ∈ T | qµ(t) > 0} is ﬁnite, then simply set νk = µ for all k ∈ N. Otherwise, we construct
(νk)k∈N as follows. For each k ∈ N, deﬁne
G
(k) := {g ∈ G | ∀i ∈ V (g),Di(g) ≤ k}
to be the set of networks in which the maximum degree is k. Note that the sequence (G(k))k∈N





µ(G(k)) if g ∈ G(k) and µ(G(k)) > 0,
0 otherwise.
42It is easy to see that (a) is satisﬁed. To see that (b) is also satisﬁed, ﬁrst recall that C (k) is
the collection of isomorphism classes in G(k). For each k ∈ N such that µ(G(k)) > 0, we have
sup
F∈FK
















































































it follows that (b) holds.
Since µ is insensitive to small probability events, we also have that d1(µ,νk) → 0. Hence,
for all ε > 0, there exists K ∈ N such that for all k > K,
sup
F∈FK





















Let k > K, and deﬁne
ˆ T
ε
µ,νk := {t ∈ T
ε
µ,νk | qνk(t) > 0}
to be the set of types in T ε
µ,νk that have positive probability under νk. By (A.15) and using



























































≥ 1 − ε.
43By deﬁnition, ˆ T ε


















we obtain the desired result.
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